Radzik (1991) showed that two-player games on compact intervals of the real line have ε -equilibria for all ε > 0, provided that payoff functions are upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave. In an attempt to generalize this theorem, Ziad (1997) stated that the same is true for n-player games on compact, convex subsets of R m , m ≥ 1 provided that we strengthen the upper semicontinuity condition.
Introduction
The standard approach to prove the existence of Nash equilibria in a normal form game is to show that the best-reply correspondence satisfies the conditions needed to apply a fixed point theorem (see, e.g., Nash (1950) and Glicksberg (1952) ). Alternatively, one can show that the best-reply correspondence satisfies the conditions needed to use a continuous selection theorem, and then apply a fixed point theorem to this selection.
The latter approach was successfully pursued by Radzik (1991) . There, he considered upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave two-player games played on compact intervals on the real line and showed that for all ε > 0, the ε -best-reply correspondence is lower hemicontinuous with closed, convex values. Hence, it follows from Michael's selection theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem that such a game has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
In an attempt to generalize Radzik's theorem, Ziad (1997) claimed that the same approach could be used in n -person normal form games played on compact, convex subsets of R m , m ≥ 1. All that seemed to be needed was a new condition, named i -upper semicontinuity, which appeared to be a strengthening of the upper semicontinuity of players' payoff functions.
In contrast to what was stated in Ziad (1997) , we show that the action spaces need to be polyhedral in order for the ε -best reply to be lower hemicontinuous. Furthermore, if players' payoff functions are quasi-concave on the joint action space, we show that Ziad's i -upper semicontinuity corresponds to quasi-polyhedral concavity of players' value functions in simple games.
1 Hence, we conclude that polyhedral convexity is a key property in extending Radzik's approach from two-player games on the real line to nperson games on higher dimensional euclidian spaces.
The relevance of our results can be understood as follows. The problem of existence of Nash equilibria is well understood in continuous, quasi-concave normal form games. 
Clearly, a function is continuous if and only if it is
upper and lower semicontinuous, and recent research has attempted to generalize such an existence theorem by weakening some or both semicontinuity assumptions.
Once one drops continuity, two questions arise, both related with the existence problem. One is: under what conditions does there exist an ε -1 This result holds with a weaker quasi-concavity requirement on players' payoff functions.
2 These are games with convex, compact action spaces and continuous payoff functions that are quasi-concave in the owner's action.
equilibrium for all ε > 0? A second then becomes: when is the limit of a sequence of ε -equilibria, with ε converging to zero, a Nash equilibrium?
The result of Radzik (1991) answers the first question for two-player games on a square and shows that the lower semicontinuity can be dispensed with altogether once the quasi-concavity is strengthened. Our results, combined with the main result of Ziad (1997) , show that the same extends to n -player games played on polytopes of R m , m ≥ 1. In fact, every game with upper semicontinuous payoff functions and quasi-polyhedral concave value functions has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
Normal form games
A normal form game G consists of a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, and, for all players i ∈ N, a pure strategy set X i , represented by a compact subset of R m , and a bounded payoff function u i : X → R, where X = × i∈N X i .
For all y ∈ R, |y| denotes the absolute value of y. Let i ∈ N . For all
We classify normal form games according to the properties of their pure strategy sets and payoff functions. A normal form game G is 1. simple if u i is a simple function (i.e., a function with the property that its range is a finite set) for all i ∈ N ;
2. upper semicontinuous if u i is upper semicontinuous for all i ∈ N ;
Note that in the last case, X i is a polytope for all i ∈ N (since X i is compact and, hence, bounded).
For all games G and players i ∈ N , let V i : X −i → R be defined by 
converging to zero. This notion was introduced by Ziad (1997) under the name of i -upper semicontinuity.
A game G is strongly quasi-concave if, for all i ∈ N , there exists a finite
This notion was first introduced by Radzik (1991) and generalized by Ziad (1997) .
A game G is polyhedral strongly quasi-concave if G is polyhedral and, for all i ∈ N , there exists a finite polyhedral cover {X and not just compact and convex.
A game G is strongly quasi-polyhedral concave if G is polyhedral and, for all i ∈ N , there exists a finite polyhedral cover {X
is polyhedral for all α ∈ R. Alternatively, we could require that X −i be covered by convex compact subsets. However, the apparently more general definition is equivalent to the above.
A game G is best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave if G is polyhedral and, for all i ∈ N , there exists a finite polyhedral cover {X
for all i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i . A Nash equilibrium of G is an ε -equilibrium for
For all ε > 0 and i ∈ N , the player i's ε -best-reply correspondence is
for all x ∈ X and the best-reply correspondence, denoted by BR, equals the product of the individual best-reply correspondences. In contrast to what is stated in Ziad (1997), we present an example of a simple, strongly upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave game with a best-reply correspondence that fails to be lower hemicontinuous.
Let f : R → R be defined by f (x) = (x − 1) 2 and let
Since f is strictly convex and continuous, then X 1 is convex and compact.
, then the ε -best-reply correspondence coincides with the best-reply correspondence.
. The payoff function for player 2 is
Note that u 2 is quasi-concave in
, is compact, and so u 2 is upper semicontinuous.
Define u 1 ≡ 0. Clearly, u 1 is quasi-concave and continuous. Finally, let
Then, G is upper semicontinuous and strongly quasiconcave.
We claim that G is also strongly upper semicontinuous. It is clear that V 1 (x 2 ) = 0 for all x 2 ∈ X 2 . Since both (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) belong to A ∪ B,
Hence, it is easy to see that X 1 × {0} is also contained in C. This implies that V 2 (x 1 ) = 1 for all x 1 ∈ X 1 , and the game is therefore strongly upper semicontinuous.
We finally show that the best-reply correspondence is not lower hemicontinuous. For that, it is enough to show that player 2's best-reply correspon-dence is not lower hemicontinuous.
by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 3.3, p. 18) . This implies that if (x, y, z) ∈ C, x < 1 and y = f (x), (x,ŷ,ẑ) . Note that
In order to get a contradiction, suppose that λ < 1. Then, (7) a contradiction. So, λ = 1 and (
This fact implies that
z k → 1. Therefore, BR 2 is not lower hemicontinuous.
As will be shown below, the best-reply correspondence fails to be lower hemicontinuous because G is not polyhedral.
Characterizations of Polytopes and Ziad's Theorem
The main point of the paper is that polyhedral convexity is an important property to establish the lower hemicontinuity of the best-reply correspondence, and therefore, to establish the existence of Nash equilibria.
In order to prove our claim, we start by providing two useful characterizations of polytopes that will be used throughout the paper. Before we state our characterizations, recall that a polytope is the convex hull of finitely many points (see Rockafellar (1970, p. 12) ) and let E(C) denote the set of extreme points of a convex set C.
Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. P is a polytope; 2. P is compact, convex and satisfies the following property: for all x ∈ P , there exists r > 0 such that
3. P is compact, convex and satisfies the following property: for all x ∈ P ,
Proof. We will prove that 1 implies 2, 2 implies 3 and 3 implies 1.
Let P be a polytope. Then, clearly, P is convex and compact. Suppose
be such that x =x and letx = (λ 1 , . . . ,λ n ).
For convenience, let
Hence,x ∈ ∆ n−1 .
Finally, consider the general case. Since P is a polytope, let a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R m be such that P = co({a 1 , . . . , a n }). We may assume that n ≥ 2 since otherwise there is nothing to prove.
since there are at least two points in {a 1 , . . . , a n }.
Let x ∈ P and let y ∈ ∆ n−1 be such that π(y) = x. Then, there existŝ r > 0 such thatr
Define r =r/||π|| and letx ∈ P ,x = x. Letỹ ∈ ∆ n−1 be such that π(ỹ) =x and definē
Thus, π(ȳ) ∈ P , that is,
For convenience, let γ =r/||π(x) − π(x)|| and α =r/(||π||||x
since both x and γx + (1 − γ)x =x belong to P . Thus,
This proves 2.
Suppose that P satisfies 2. We claim that for all x ∈ P , there exists ε > 0
be such that x k = x and x k ∈ E(P ) for all k ∈ N and assume, in order to reach a contradiction, that x k converges to x.
there exists r > 0 such that
Since ||x k − x|| → 0, there exists K ∈ N such that
But this is a contradiction, since x ∈ P ,x k ∈ P ,x k = x, α k ∈ (0, 1) and x k is an extreme point of P . This contradiction establishes 3.
Finally, we show that 3 implies 1. For all x ∈ P , let ε(x) > 0 be such
is an open cover of P , and since P is compact, then there exists {x 1 , . . . , x m } ⊆ P such that
The equivalence between the first and third properties simply states that a compact, convex set is a polytope if and only if its extreme points are isolated.
The second property is also easy to understand when r ≤ ||x −x||, since in this case its conclusion follows readily from the convexity of P . The interesting case occurs when ||x −x|| is smaller than r: in this case, the point θx + (1 − θ)x with θ = r/||x − x|| > 1 corresponds to connecting x andx with a line and, starting from x, going beyondx. The equivalence between 1 and 2 shows that this can be done for all pointsx and for some r > 0 in a way that the resulting point is still in P if and only if P is a polytope. 
for all k ∈ N. If X −i is a polytope, then it follows that z −i,k belongs to X −i for all k sufficiently large. In fact, let r > 0 be given by property 2
Since the latter point belongs to X −i , then z −i,k also belongs to X −i .
In contrast, as the example in the previous section shows, this conclusion may fail if X −i is not a polytope. Hence, the correct statement of Ziad's Theorem is:
6 There is also a mistake in the statement of Lemma 3.3, since it claims that BR ε i is upper hemicontinuous instead of lower hemicontinuous. This also implies that the existence of an approximate equilibrium is a consequence of Michael's selection theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem as in Radzik (1991) and not of Kakutani's fixed point theorem as claimed in Ziad (1997).
Theorem 1 (Ziad) If G is a polyhedral, strongly upper semicontinuos and strongly quasi-concave game, then G has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
A Characterization of Strong Upper Semicontinuity
As we have shown in the previous section, the polyhedral convexity of the action spaces is essential to the lower hemicontinuity of the (approximate) best-reply correspondence and, therefore, to any approach to the existence of (approximate) equilibria based on that property.
The importance of polyhedral convexity is strengthened here by relating the polyhedral concavity of the players' value functions to strong upper semicontinuity. In particular, we show that strong upper semicontinuity is equivalent to best-reply strong quasi-polyhedral concavity in simple, upper semicontinuous and polyhedral strongly quasi-concave games.
Proposition 2 Let G be a simple, upper semicontinuous and polyhedral strongly quasi-concave game. Then, G is strongly upper semicontinuous if and only if G is best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave.
In order to prove Proposition 2, we start by establishing a result of in-dependent interest since it shows that in upper semicontinuous games (not necessarily simple), best-reply strong quasi-polyhedral concavity is a sufficient condition for strong upper semicontinuity.
Lemma 1 Let G be a best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave game.
zero. Thus, if, in addition, G is upper semicontinuous, then G is strongly upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Let G be a normal form game and assume that G is best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave.
⊆ X −i be a sequence converging to x −i and
. Hence, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that x
Since the cover is finite, we may assume
Since P is a polytope, let r > 0 be such that
Let J = max{J 1 , J 2 } and j ≥ J. Then,
and so
Since this holds for all j ≥ J, it follows that
and so u i is strongly upper semicontinuous.
It is worth noting that the converse of Lemma 1 is false. For example,
Clearly, G is strongly upper semicontinuous since u i is continuous for all i = 1, 2. However, G is not best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave: in order to reach a contra-
that it belongs to the interior of some X l 1 and let α = V 2 (x,ŷ). Then,
are extreme points of C and so C is not a polytope. Hence, V 2 is not quasi-polyhedral concave in X l 1 , a contradiction.
We next turn to the remaining part of Proposition 2. The following lemma asserts that the quasi-(polyhedral) concavity of u i is inherited by V i .
Lemma 2 Let i ∈ N , C −i be a polyhedral subset of X −i and u i be upper
Since u i is upper semicontinuous, there exists
≥ γ} is convex and since π −i is linear then, by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 19.3, p. 174) ,
polyhedral by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 19.3, p. 174 ).
The following lemma shows that if players' value functions are polyhedral strongly quasi-concave in a simple, strong upper semicontinuous game, then they are in fact strongly quasi-polyhedral concave.
Lemma 3 If G is simple, strong upper semicontinuous and polyhedral strongly quasi-concave, then, G is best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave.
Proof. Let G be a simple and strongly upper semicontinuous game and,
l=1 be a polyhedral cover of
semicontinuous, V i is upper semicontinuous (see Berge (1997, Theorem 2, p.116) ), and so P is compact. Since V i is quasi-concave in X l −i , then P is convex. In order to show that P is a polytope, it is enough to show that
Let x −i ∈ P . In order to prove the above claim, it suffices to show that no sequence {x
assume, in order to reach a contradiction, that x k −i converges to x −i .
Since X l −i is a polytope, by Proposition 1, there exists r > 0 such that
and sox
Since u i is strongly upper semicontinuous, then lim sup
But this is a contradiction, since 6 Relation between Radzik's and Ziad's Theorems Proposition 2 is also useful to compare Ziad's theorem with Radzik's. Clearly, Ziad allows for more generality on the number of players and on the action spaces (since the action spaces in Radzik (1991) are intervals in R, and these sets are polytopes). However, it might seem that Radzik's theorem allows for more general payoff functions since it only requires upper semicontinuity, but not strong upper semicontinuity. However, for two-player simple games on a square, strong upper semicontinuity is equivalent to upper semicontinuity. Therefore, Radzik's theorem is a corollary of Ziad's theorem 1. Proof. Let G be an upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave game. Let i ∈ N . Obviously, X i is polyhedral.
of X −i ⊆ R, and so an interval. Since G is upper semicontinuous, then
Hence, it is a closed interval and so a polytope.
Combining the above proposition with Ziad's Theorem, we obtain the main result in Radzik (1991) .
Corollary 2 (Radzik) If G is an upper semicontinuous and strongly quasiconcave two-player game, and X i is a compact interval on the real line for all i = 1, 2, then G has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
We can also obtain an existence result for n -person games played in polytopes that parallels the statement of Radzik's Theorem and is, again, a corollary of Ziad's.
Corollary 3 If G is a strongly upper semicontinuous and best-reply strongly quasi-polyhedral concave game, then G has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
In particular, if G is a strongly upper semicontinuous and strongly quasipolyhedral concave game, then G has an ε -equilibrium for all ε > 0.
The first part of the above corollary follows at once from Ziad's Theorem and Lemma 1, while the second follows from the first and Lemma 2. Furthermore, using again Proposition 3, it follows that Corollary 3 implies Radzik's Theorem.
Concluding Remarks
The approach for the existence results discussed in this paper relies on the lower hemicontinuity of the best-reply correspondence. As the example in Section 3 shows, this condition may fail even if the game satisfies the assumptions in Ziad (1997) , leading to the conclusion that the action spaces need to be polytopes in order for his result to hold.
Unfortunately, we have been unable to find an example of a game satisfying all of Ziad's assumptions but without ε -equilibria for some ε > 0. In particular, note that in the example in Section 3, despite the fact that BR 2 is not lower hemicontinuous, it admits a continuous selection: f (x 1 ) = 0 for all x 1 ∈ X 1 . Since the same is true for BR 1 we conclude that this game has a Nash equilibrium. Thus, two questions arise: Does the best-reply correspon- If this conjecture is true, then strong upper semicontinuity is equivalent to best-reply quasi-polyhedral concavity in all simple, upper semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave games.
